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Abstract
Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in ex-
tensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They
always exist in infinite games with continuous real-valued payoffs, but may fail to exist even
in simple games with slightly discontinuous payoffs. This article considers only games whose
outcome functions are measurable in the Hausdorff difference hierarchy of the open sets (i.e.
∆0
2
when in the Baire space), and it characterizes the families of linear preferences such that
every game using these preferences has a subgame perfect equilibrium: the preferences with-
out infinite ascending chains (of course), and such that for all players a and b and outcomes
x, y, z we have ¬(z <a y <a x ∧ x <b z <b y). Moreover at each node of the game, the
equilibrium constructed for the proof is Pareto-optimal among all the outcomes occurring in
the subgame. Additional results for non-linear preferences are presented.
Keywords: infinite multi-player games in extensive form, subgame perfection, Borel hierarchy,
preference characterization, Pareto-optimality.
1 Introduction
Game theory is the theory of competitive interactions between agents having different interests.
Until the late 1960’s an agent would usually represent a human or group of humans, when
game theory was mainly meant for economics and political science. Then game theory was also
applied to evolutionary biology [24] and to theoretical computer science [4], especially to system
verification and system synthesis (against given specifications). Classically, the verification or
synthesis problem is represented as a game with two players: the system trying to win the game
by meeting the specifications, and the environment trying to win the game by preventing the
system from doing so. The two players play this game in turn and deterministically on a finite
or infinite directed graph, and the key notion is that of winning strategy. For a decade, though,
computer scientists such as Ummels [26] have been considering multi-player games to represent
more complex verification or synthesis problems, e.g. relating to distributed systems. The notion
of winning strategy is specific to two-player win-lose games, but in a multi-player setting it may
be replaced with a faithful extension, namely the famous notion of (pure) Nash equilibrium.
It does not only accommodate more than two players, it also allows for refined/quantitative
objectives.
The deterministic turn-based games on graphs may be unfolded, usually without much loss
of information, into deterministic turn-based games on finite or infinite trees, which have been
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widely studied in game theory. It is one reason why this article focuses on perfect information
games in extensive form (i.e. played on trees) and their deterministic strategies, unless otherwise
stated.
Kuhn [12] proved the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) in finite games with real-valued
payoffs. His proofs uses backward induction and constructs a special kind of NE that was later
called subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) by Selten [23]. An extension of Kuhn’s result [13]
characterizes the preferences that always yield finite games with NE/SPE: the acyclic prefer-
ences. Also, Escardo´ and Oliva [5] studied generalizations of backward induction in possibly
infinite yet well-founded game trees, i.e. without infinite plays. The SPE have nice extra prop-
erties and are usually preferred over the more general NE: for psychology in a broad sense an
SPE amounts to the absence of empty threats, and for system engineering in a broad sense it
amounts to stability of a system regardless of the initial state.
The concept of infinite horizon is convenient in economics and also in computer science,
e.g., for liveness. Gale and Stewart [9] studied infinite two-player win-lose games, but backward
induction is no longer applicable since there may not be leaves to start the induction at. Nev-
ertheless, they proved that if the winning set of each player is open or closed (with the usual
topology), one player has a wining strategy. This result was extended by Wolfe [27] for Σ02 and
Π02 sets, then by other people to more complex sets, and eventually by Martin for Borel [19] and
even quasi-Borel [20] sets. This is called (quasi-)Borel determinacy.
Mertens and Neymann [21, p. 1567] found that Borel determinacy can be used to show
existence of ǫ-NE in infinite games with bounded Borel-measurable real-valued payoffs. By
generalizing their technique, an abstract result about point-classes and determinacy [14] implies
a characterization of the preferences that always yield games with NE, in games with (quasi-
)Borel-measurable outcome functions, countably many outcomes, and an arbitrary cardinality
of players: the preferences whose inverses are well-founded. Then it was shown [16] that two-
player antagonistic games (i.e. abstract zero-sum games) with finitely many outcomes and
(quasi-)Borel-measurable outcome function have SPE.
When the outcome function is a continuous real-valued payoff function, Fudenberg and
Levine [8] showed that there is always an SPE in multi-player games. Similar results were
obtained recently via an abstract and uniform density argument [16]. The continuity assumption
may be slightly relaxed if one is willing to accept approximate SPE. Indeed existence of ǫ-SPE
was proved for lower-semicontinuous [6] and upper-semicontinuous [22] payoffs.
However, when the real-valued payoff function is discontinuous enough and the preferences
are not antagonistic, there may be no (ǫ-)SPE, as in the following example which is similar
to [25, Example 3]. Let a and b be two players with preferences z <a y <a x and x <b z <b y.
They are alternatively given the possibility to stop and yield outcomes y and z, respectively,
but the outcome is x if no one ever stops.
start a b a b x
y z y z
In addition, a real-valued two-player game [7] was recently designed with the following features:
it has a similar preference pattern as in the example above, and it has no ǫ-SPE for small enough
ǫ even when the players are allowed to use mixed strategies at every node of the game tree. All
this shows that Mertens [21] was right when writing that ”Subgame perfectness is a completely
different issue” from NE. This article solves the issue partially, and the contribution is two-
fold. First, it characterizes the linear preferences that always yield SPE in games with outcome
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functions in the Hausdorff difference hierarchy of the open sets: the preferences that are void
of infinite ascending chains (of course) and of the SPE killer from the example above. Said
otherwise, if ¬(z <a y <a x ∧ x <b z <b y) holds for all players a and b and all outcomes x, y
and z of a multi-player game with outcome function in the difference hierarchy (and preferences
without infinite ascending chains), the game has an SPE, and even a global-Pareto one, as in
Definition 9. Second contribution, the characterization still holds for two-player games with
strict weak order preferences, but no longer for three-player games. (Strict weak orders are
important since they are an abstraction of the usual preference order over the real-valued payoff
functions.)
Section 2 consists of definitions; Section 3 proves the characterization for many players and
linear preferences; Section 4 proves the characterization for two players and strict weak order
preferences.
Related works Characterizing the preferences that guarantee existence of NE in interesting
classes of games is not a new idea: earlier than the two examples above ([13], [14]), Gimbert and
Zielonka [10] ”characterise the family of payoff mappings for which there always exist optimal
positional strategies for both players” in some win-lose games played on finite graphs. Also, [15]
characterizes the preferences that guarantee existence of NE in determined, countable two-player
game forms.
The notion of SPE has also been studied in connection with system verification and synthesis,
at low levels of the Borel hierarchy: in [26] with qualitative objectives, in [2] with quantitative
objective for reachability, and in [3] with quantitative objectives and a weak variant of SPE.
Finally, some specific infinite games in extensive form (such as the dollar auction) and espe-
cially their SPE have been studied using co-algebraic methods in [18] and [1].
2 Technical background
The games in this article are built on infinite trees, which may be defined as prefix-closed sets
of finite sequences. The elements of a tree are called nodes. Intuitively, a node represents both
a position in the tree and the only path from the root to this position.
Definition 1 (Tree) Let Σ be a set.
• Σ∗ (Σω) is the set of finite (infinite) sequences over Σ, and a tree over Σ is a subset T of
Σ∗ such that γ ⊑ δ (i.e. γ is a prefix of δ) and δ ∈ T implies γ ∈ T .
• For a node γ in a tree T , let succ(T, γ) := {δ ∈ T | γ ⊑ δ ∧ |δ| = |γ| + 1}, where |γ| is
the length of γ.
• A tree T is pruned if succ(T, γ) 6= ∅ for all γ ∈ T .
• Let T be a tree over Σ. The set [T ] is made of the infinite paths of T , namely the elements
of Σω whose every finite prefix is in T .
• Let T be a tree over Σ. For γ ∈ T let Tγ := {δ ∈ Σ
∗ | γδ ∈ T}.
In this article the outcomes of a game correspond to some partition of the infinite paths of the
game tree, and the subsets of the partition are restricted to the Hausdorff difference hierarchy
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of the open sets. This hierarchy is defined in, e.g., [11, 22.E], but a probably-folklore result [17,
Section 2.4] gives an equivalent presentation, which is in turn rephrased in Definition 4 below.
These new definitions facilitate the proofs by induction in this article. Then, the Hausdorff-
Kuratowski theorem (see, e.g., [11, Theorem 22.27]) implies that, in the Baire space (i.e. NN),
the difference hierarchy is equal to ∆02, the sets that are both countable unions of closed sets
and countable intersections of open sets. This equality tells how low the difference hierarchy lies
in the Borel hierarchy.
For every pruned tree T , let {γ[Tγ ] | γ ∈ T} be a basis for the open subsets of [T ]. Def-
inition 2 below is a special case of a more general definition that can be found, e.g., in [11,
22.E].
Definition 2 (Difference hierarchy) Let T be a pruned tree, θ > 0 be a countable ordinal,
and (Aη)η<θ be an increasing sequence of open subsets of [T ]. Dθ((Aη)η<θ) is defined as below.
x ∈ Dθ((Aη)η<θ) :⇔x ∈ ∪η<θAη and the least η < θ with x ∈ Aη has parity opposite to that of θ.
And Dθ([T ]) := {Dθ((Aη)η<θ) | ∀η < θ,Aη is an open subset of [T ]}.
Observation 3 Dθ+1((Aη)η<θ+1) = Aθ \Dθ((Aη)η<θ)
Definition 4, Lemma 6, and Proposition 7 relate to [17, Section 2.4].
Definition 4 (Quasi-difference sets) Let T be a pruned tree. The set D([T ]) is defined by
transfinite induction below.
• Every open set of [T ] is in D([T ]).
• Let (γi)i∈I be pairwise non-comparable nodes in T , and for all i ∈ I let Di ∈ D([T ]) be
such that Di ⊆ γi[Tγi ]. Then ∪i∈IDi ∈ D([T ]).
• The complement in [T ] of a set in D([T ]) is also in D([T ]).
One can prove Observation 5 below by induction along Definition 4.
Observation 5 Given a node γ of a pruned tree T , and A ∈ D([T ]), γ[Tγ ] ∩A ∈ D([T ]).
Lemma 6 Dθ ⊆ D([T ]) for all non-zero countable ordinal θ and all pruned tree T .
Proof By induction on θ, which holds for θ = 1 since D1([T ]) is made of the open subsets of
[T ]. Let θ > 1 be an ordinal and let A ∈ Dθ, so A = Dθ((Aη)η<θ) for some family (Aη)η<θ of
open subsets of [T ] that is increasing for the inclusion. Every Aη is open so it can be written
∪i∈Iγη,i[Tγη,i ] where γη,i and γη,j are not proper prefixes of one another (but are possibly equal)
for all η < θ and i, j ∈ I. We can also require some minimality for all γη,i, more specifically
γ ⊏ γη,i ⇒ ¬(γ[Tγ ] ⊆ Aη). Let F consists of the minimal prefixes among {γη,i | i ∈ I ∧ η < θ},
and for all γ ∈ F let f(γ) be the least η such that γ = γη,i for some i ∈ I. So f(γ) < θ
for all γ ∈ F , and A ⊆ ∪η<θAη = ∪γ∈Fγ[Tγ ], so A = ∪γ∈FA ∩ γ[Tγ ]. Let γ ∈ F and let us
make a case disjunction to show that A ∩ γ[Tγ ] ∈ D([T ]). First case, f(γ) and θ have the same
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parity, so A∩γ[Tγ ] = Df(γ)((Aη ∩γ[Tγ ])η<f(γ)) ∈ Df(γ)([T ]), so A∩γ[Tγ ] ∈ D([T ]) by induction
hypothesis. Second case, f(γ) and θ have opposite parity, so
A ∩ γ[Tγ ] = Df(γ)+1((Aη ∩ γ[Tγ ])η<f(γ)+1) by Definition 2,
= (Af(γ) ∩ γ[Tγ ]) \Df(γ)((Aη ∩ γ[Tγ ])η<f(γ))) by Observation 3,
= γ[Tγ ] \Df(γ)((Aη ∩ γ[Tγ ])η<f(γ))) by definition of F ∋ γ and f(γ),
∈ D([T ]) by induction hypothesis and Observation 5.
Therefore A ∈ D([T ]). 
Proposition 7 below shows that the quasi-difference sets coincide with the sets in the difference
hierarchy for countable trees, just like quasi-Borel sets [20] and Borel sets coincide on Polish
spaces.
Proposition 7 D([T ]) = ∪θ<ω1Dθ([T ]) for all countable pruned tree T .
Proof ∪θ<ω1Dθ ⊆ D([T ]) was already proved in Lemma 6, so let A ∈ D([T ]). Let us prove
that A ∈ Dθ([T ]) for some θ, by induction on the definition of D([T ]). Base case, if A is open,
A ∈ D1([T ]).
Second case, let (γi)i∈I be pairwise non-comparable nodes in T , and let Ai ∈ D([T ])∩ γi[Tγi ]
for all i ∈ I, such that A = ∪i∈IAi. By induction hypothesis Ai ∈ Dθi for some θi < ω1.
Let θ := supi∈I θi, so θ < ω1 by countability of T , and Ai ∈ Dθ for all i ∈ I. For all i ∈ I
let (Ai,η)η<θ be an increasing sequence of open sets such that Ai = Dθ((Ai,η)η<θ). So A =
∪i∈IDθ((Ai,η)η<θ) = Dθ((∪i∈IAi,η)η<θ), which shows that A ∈ Dθ([T ]).
Third case, A is the complement of B ∈ Dθ([T ]) for some θ < ω1. So B = Dθ((Bη)η<θ) for
some increasing sequence of open sets of [T ]. Let Bθ = [T ], so A = Dθ+1((Bη)η<θ+1). 
Informally, a play of a game starts at the root of an infinite game tree and at each stage of the
game the unique owner of the current node chooses a child of the node. The articles [14] and
[16] used game trees of the form C∗ because it was more convenient and done without much
loss of generality, but this article works with general pruned trees because they will be cut in a
non-uniform way. Moreover pruned trees are general enough, since leaves in infinite games can
be simulated by the pseudo-leaves defined below.
Definition 8 (Game, subgame, pseudo-leaf) An infinite game g is a tuple 〈A,T, d,O, v, (≺a
)a∈A〉 complying with the following.
• A is a non-empty set (of players).
• T is a non-empty pruned tree (of possible finite plays).
• d : T → A (assigns a decision maker to each stage of the game).
• O is a non-empty set (of possible outcomes of the game).
• v : [T ]→ O (uses outcomes to value the infinite plays in the tree).
• Each ≺a is a binary relation over O (modelling the preference of player a).
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For γ ∈ T , the subgame gγ is defined by dγ : Tγ → A such that dγ(δ) := d(γδ) and by vγ : [Tγ ]→
O such that vγ(p) := v(γp). A x-pseudo-leaf of g is a shortest node γ ∈ T such that only the
outcome x occurs in gγ .
Definition 9 (strategy profile, induced play, global-Pareto equilibrium) Let g = 〈A,T, d,O, v, (≺a
)a∈A〉 be a game.
• A strategy profile is a function s : T → T such that s(γ) ∈ succ(T, γ) for all γ ∈ T . Let Sg
be the set of the strategy profiles for g. For γ ∈ T and s ∈ Sg the subprofile sγ : Tγ → Tγ
is defined by the equality γsγ(δ) = s(γδ).
• For γ ∈ T and s ∈ Sg, the play p = p
γ(s) induced by s at γ is defined inductively by
p0 . . . p|γ|−1 := γ and pn := s(p0 . . . pn−1) for all n > |γ|.
• A Nash equilibrium is a profile s ∈ Sg such that
NEg(s) := ∀s
′ ∈ Sg,∀a ∈ A, ¬(v ◦p
ǫ(s) ≺a v ◦p
ǫ(s′) ∧ (∀γ ∈ T, s(γ) 6= s′(γ)⇒ d(γ) = a))
A subgame perfect equilibrium is a profile s ∈ Sg such that NEgγ(sγ) for all γ ∈ T .
• Let O′ ⊆ O. One says that x ∈ O′ is Pareto-optimal in O′ if for all y ∈ O′ and a ∈ A
such that x ≺a y there exists b ∈ B such that y ≺b x. A global-Pareto Nash equilibrium
(GP-NE) is an NE whose induced outcome is Pareto-optimal in the outcomes occurring in
the underlying game. A GP-SPE is a profile that induces a GP-NE in every subgame.
The proofs in this article do not build SPE by mere backward induction, but more generally by
recursively refining rational behavioral promises. At each stage the refinement is optimal given
the existing promises and regardless of the future ones. Since a promise not to choose a specific
successor of a given node cannot be represent by a strategy profile, the more general notion of
quasi-profile is defined below.
Definition 10 (quasi profile) Let g = 〈A,T, d,O, v, (≺a)a∈A〉 be a game.
• A quasi profile is a multivalued function q : T ⊸ T such that ∅ 6= q(γ) ⊆ succ(γ) for
all γ ∈ T . Let Qg be the set of the quasi profiles for g. For γ ∈ T and q ∈ Qg the
sub-quasi-profile qγ : Tγ ⊸ Tγ is defined by the equality γqγ(δ) = q(γδ).
• For γ ∈ T and q ∈ Qg, the tree induced by q starting at γ is defined inductively by ǫ ∈ Tγ(q),
where ǫ is the empty sequence, and δ ∈ Tγ(q)⇒ qγ(δ) ⊆ Tγ(q).
• Let q ∈ Qg. Let (γi)i∈I be the nodes of T such that γi /∈ q(γ) for all γ ∈ T , and let
G(g, q) := {gγi |Tγi (q)}i∈I .
Making a promise in a game g by defining a quasi-profile q splits the game into ”smaller”
games, formally via G(g, q). If the promise is rational, these ”smaller” games can be processed
independently since gluing any of their respective SPE will yield an SPE for g. Towards this,
Observation 11 below suggests that the recursive refinement will lead to a fully defined strategy
profile of g, if performed a sufficiently great (ordinal) number of times.
Observation 11 Let g be a game on a tree T , let q be a quasi profile for g, and let G(g, q) =
{gγi |Tγi (q)}i∈I . Then {γiTγi(q)}i∈I is a partition of T .
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3 Many players with linearly ordered preferences
This section characterizes the linear preferences that always yield SPE in games with Dω1-
measurable outcome functions: the families of preferences without infinite ascending chains and
without the SPE killer, i.e. the pattern z <a y <a x ∧ x <b z <b y for some players a and
b and outcomes x, y, z. The main difficulty is tackled by Lemma 12 and corollary 13 below.
It consists in slightly generalizing an existing result [16] stating that two-player Borel games
with antagonist preferences have SPE by considering preferences that are almost antagonist,
but in addition there is an outcome y that is the worst one for both players, and the set of
plays with outcome y is a closed set (union an open set). This is then generalized for a set
in Dω1 by induction, and eventually to multi-player games without the SPE killer thanks to a
combinatorial result.
Lemma 12 Let a game involve two players a and b, preferences y <a xn <a · · · <a x1 and
y <b x1 <b · · · <b xn for some n, such that all plays without pseudo-leaves have outcome y. The
game has a global-Pareto subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof Let us consider only infinite games involving two players a and b, preferences y <a
xn <a · · · <a x1 and y <b x1 <b · · · <b xn for some n. Let us call a game weak-stop if every
play without pseudo-leaves has outcome y, and strong-stop if in addition every node that does
not lie on a play with outcome y has a prefix that is a pseudo-leaf. Note the following: in
every weak-stop game the plays with outcome y form a closed set; for every quasi profile q for a
weak-stop game g, the set G(g, q) contains only weak-stop games; and modifying the outcome
function of a weak-stop game such that it is constant on given subgames yields a weak-stop
game. (But the same does not hold for strong-stop games.) Let us call a node of a strong-stop
game an ak (bk) node if it is owned by player a (b), and if it is the parent of a xk-pseudo-leaf.
Let us call every ak (bk) node a a-stop (b-stop) node, and furthermore let us call every a-stop
or b-stop node a stop node.
Let us prove the claim by induction on n, which holds for n = 0 and n = 1, so let us assume
that 1 < n. Five transformations on games are defined below, and they are meant to be applied
recursively to a weak-stop game.
1. ”Weak-stop towards strong-stop”: Let g be a weak-stop game on tree T . Let γ be a
node such that gγ involves more than one outcome but not y. By construction gγ is an
antagonist game, and it amounts, when seeing a pseudo-leaf as a leaf, to a game without
infinite plays, but possibly without uniform bound on the length of the plays. By [5] it
has a GP-SPE sγ nonetheless, which induces some xk. Let us derive a weak-stop game g
′
from g by modification of the outcome function: for all p ∈ [T ] let v′(p) := xk if γ ⊑ p and
v′(p) := v(p) otherwise. Pasting sγ at node γ on a GP-SPE s
′ for g′ yields a GP-SPE s for
g. Formally s(γδ) := sγ(δ) for all δ ∈ Tγ and s(δ) := s
′(δ) for all δ ∈ T such that γ 6⊑ δ.
2. ”Emptying the interior of y”: Let g be a strong-stop game on tree T and let γ be a
y-pseudo-leaf. If γ = ǫ all profiles for g are GP-SPE. If γ is not the root of g let us
define a quasi profile q for g by letting the owner of the parent of γ ignore γ. Formally,
q(δ) := succ(T, δ)\{γ} for all δ ∈ T . Since y is the worst outcome for both players, none
will have an incentive to deviate from this promise, regardless of the future choices at the
other nodes. G(g, q) contains gγ and a weak-stop game g
′. Combining any profile sγ for
gγ and a GP-SPE for g
′ yields a GP-SPE for g.
7
3. ”b chooses xn”: Let g be a strong-stop game on tree T , let γ be a bn node and let
δ ∈ succ(T, γ) be an xn-pseudo-leaf. Let us define a quasi profile q for g by letting b choose
δ at γ. Formally, q(γ) := {δ} and q(α) := succ(T, α) for all α ∈ T\{γ}. Since xn is b’s
preferred outcome, she will have no incentive to deviate from this choice, regardless of the
choices at the other nodes. So, finding a GP-SPE for every weak-stop game in G(g, q) will
complete the definition of a GP-SPE for g.
4. ”a ignores xn”: Let g be a strong-stop game. Let γ be a node in g such that gγ involves
outcome y but no b-stop nodes, and such that every subgame of gγ involving outcome y
has an ak node for some k < n. Let us define a quasi profile q for g by letting a ignore all
xn-pseudo-leaves at all an nodes below γ. The set G(g, q) is made of games involving only
outcome xn and of one g
′ such that g′γ does not involve xn. By induction hypothesis g
′
γ has
an GP-SPE s′γ , which induces some xk. Let us define g
′′ by modification of the outcome
function of g: for all p ∈ γ[Tγ ] let v
′′(p) := xk and for all p ∈ [T ]\γ[Tγ ] let v
′′(p) := v(p).
Pasting s′γ on a GP-SPE s
′′ for g′′ yields a GP-SPE for g.
5. ”a chooses xn”: Let g be a strong-stop game. Let γ be such that gγ involves outcome y
and every subgame of gγ involving y has some an nodes but no ak node for all k < n. To
build for gγ a GP-SPE sγ inducing xn on all of its subprofiles, it suffices, first, to choose
arbitrary profiles for the subgames rooted at the xn-pseudo-leaves of gγ , and second, to fix
consistently paths from each node to an xn-pseudo-leaf. This second step can be done by
letting player a choose an xn-pseudo-leaf at some node, which defines a quasi profile q, and
by repeating it recursively for the games in G(gγ , q). This sγ is a GP-SPE because every
subprofile induces outcome xn, which is b’s preferred outcome, and the only alternative
for a in every subprofile is outcome y since all a-stop nodes are an nodes. Let us define g
′
by modification of the outcome function of g: for all p ∈ γ[Tγ ] let v
′(p) := xn and for all
p ∈ [T ]\γ[Tγ ] let v
′(p) := v(p). Pasting sγ on a GP-SPE s
′ for g′ yields a GP-SPE for g.
Given a weak-stop game g, let us apply to it the five transformations above, sequentially,
non-deterministically whenever they are applicable, and until none of them is applicable, i.e.
possibly an ordinal number of times. This yields a set G of strong-stop games (otherwise
Transformation 1 could be applied) whose subgames that involve outcome y all have stop nodes
(otherwise Transformation 2 could be applied), without bn nodes (otherwise Transformation 3
could be applied), such that every subgame that involves y but no b-stop nodes has a subgame
without ak nodes for all k < n (otherwise Transformation 4 could be applied), and such that
every subgame h′ of every game in G has the following property (otherwise Transformation 5
could be applied): if every subgame of h′ has a a-stop node, h′ has an ak node for some k < n.
Let h′ be a subgame of h ∈ G, and that involves y. If h′ has no b-stop nodes, combining the
properties above shows that all of its subgames have a-stop nodes, so one of them has only an
nodes, contradiction, so every subgame of h that involves y has a b-stop node.
For every h ∈ G let us define the quasi profile q by letting a ignore all the xn-pseudo-leaves.
G(h, q) is made of games involving the outcome xn only and of one h
′ void of xn. Since every
subgame of h that involves y has a b-stop node, it also holds for h′. By induction hypothesis, h′
has a GP-SPE, which is easily extended to a GP-SPE for h, thus completing the definition of a
GP-SPE for the original g. 
Corollary 13 Given a game g with two players a and b, a quasi-Borel measurable outcome
function, and preferences y <a xn <a · · · <a x1 and y <b x1 <b · · · <b xn for some n. If the
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plays with outcome y form the union of an open set and a closed set, the game has a global-Pareto
subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof Let the plays with outcome y be the union Y = Yo ∪ Yc of an open set and a closed
set. Wlog Yo and Yc are disjoint. Let us derive g
′ from g by removing the plays in Yo. So the
plays of g′ that do not yield outcome y form an open set, i.e. a disjoint union of clopen balls
with defined by the prefixes (γi)i∈I . Every game gγi is antagonist and quasi-Borel, so it has
an SPE si by [16]. Let us define g
′′ by modification of the outcome function of g′: every play
going through γi yields the outcome induced by si. This g
′′ has a GP-SPE s′′ by Lemma 12,
and together with the si it can be used to build a GP-SPE for g. 
Let us extend Corollary 13 from open union closed to the difference hierarchy.
Lemma 14 Let be a game on a tree T , with two players a and b and preferences y <a xn <a
· · · <a x1 and y <b x1 <b · · · <b xn, and let us assume that each set of plays with outcome xi
is quasi-Borel and that Y the set of plays with outcome y is in Dω1([T ]). Then the game has a
global-Pareto subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof By transfinite induction on the level of Y in the difference hierarchy. The base case
where Y is open or closed is solved by Corollary 13.
For the inductive case, let us make a case disjunction depending on the last step of the
construction of Y . For the union case, Y = ∪i∈NγiYi for some Yi that have lower levels than
Y in the difference hierarchy, and where the γi are not prefixes of one another. By induction
hypothesis each gγi has a GP-SPE si inducing either y or an outcome xk(i). Let us start the
construction of a profile s for g by fixing the si as the respective subprofiles for the g |γiTγi . Let
us define g′ by modification of the outcome function of g: let each play going through γi yield
the outcome induced by si. This is a quasi-Borel game and the plays with outcome y form an
open set, so it has a GP-SPE s′ by Corollary 13, which we use to complete the definition of s.
It is easy to check that s is a GP-SPE for g.
For the complementation case, Y = [T ]\([T ]\Y ), where [T ]\Y is equal to ∪i∈NγiXi for some
Xi that have lower levels than [T ]\Y (and Y ) in the difference hierarchy, and where the γi are
not prefixes of one another. Since all Y ∩ [γiTγi ] = [γiTγi ]\γiXi have lower levels than Y in the
difference hierarchy, by induction hypothesis each gγi has a GP-SPE si inducing either y or an
outcome xk(i). Let us start the construction of a profile s for g by fixing the si as the respective
subprofiles for the g |γiTγi . Let us define g
′ by modification of the outcome function of g: let
each play going through γi yield the outcome induced by si. This is a quasi-Borel game and the
plays with outcome y form the union of an open set and the closed set [T ]\∪i∈I [γiTγi ], so it has
a GP-SPE s′ by Corollary 13, which we use to complete the definition of s. It is easy to check
that s is a GP-SPE for g. 
The combinatorial Lemma 15 below shows that the ”local” absence of the SPE-killer amounts
to a very simple ”global” structure.
Lemma 15 Let A be a non-empty set and for all a ∈ A let <a be a strict linear order over
some non-empty set O. The following assertions are equivalent.
1. ∀a, b ∈ A,∀x, y, z ∈ O, ¬(z <a y <a x ∧ x <b z <b y).
2. There exists a partition {Oi}i∈I of O and a linear order < over I such that:
(a) i < j implies x <a y for all a ∈ A and x ∈ Oi and y ∈ Oj .
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(b) <b|Oi=<a|Oi or <b|Oi=<a|
−1
Oi
for all a, b ∈ A.
If 1. and 2. hold, we may also assume that <b|Oi=<a|
−1
Oi
is witnessed for all i ∈ I. Also, Oi is
always a <a-interval for all (i, a) ∈ I ×A, as implied by 2a.
Proof 2⇒ 1 is straightforward, so let us assume 1. Let x ∼ y stand for ∃a, b ∈ A, x ≤a
y ≤b x, which defines a reflexive and symmetric relation, and note that due to the SPE killer
z <a y <a x ∧ x <b z <b y the following holds: if x <a y and y <b x, then x <a z <a y iff
y <b z <b x. To show that ∼ is transitive too, let us assume that x ∼ y ∼ z. If x, y, z are not
pairwise distinct, x ∼ z follows directly, so let us assume that they are pairwise distinct, so by
assumption there exist a, b, c, d ∈ A such that y <a x <b y <c z <d y. To show that x ∼ z
there are three cases depending on where z lies with respect to y <a x, all cases invoking the
(above-mentioned) forbidden-pattern argument: if y <a z <a x then x <b z <b y, and x ∼ z
follows; if y <a x <a z then z <d x <d y and subsequently y <c x <c z, by invoking twice the
forbidden-pattern argument, and x ∼ z follows; third case, let us assume that z <a y <a x. If
x <b z then x ∼ z follows, and if z <b x then z <b x <b y, so y <c x <c z, and x ∼ z follows.
Therefore ∼ is an equivalence relation; let {Oi}i∈I be the corresponding partition of O.
Now let us show that the ∼-classes are <a-intervals for all a, so let x ∼ y and x <a z <a y.
By definition of ∼, there exists b such that y <b x, in which case y <b z <b x by the forbidden-
pattern argument, so x ∼ z by definition.
Let x ∈ Oi and y ∈ Oj be such that x <a y. Since Oi and Oj are intervals, x
′ <a y
′ for all
x′ ∈ Oi and y
′ ∈ Oj . Since ¬(x
′ ∼ y′) by assumption, x′ <b y
′ for all b ∈ A, by definition of ∼.
In this case defining i < j meets the requirements.
Before proving 2b let us prove that if x <a y and y <b x and z ∼ y, then z <a y iff y <b z:
this is trivial if z equals x or y, so let us assume that x 6= z 6= y, and also that z <a y. If z <b y,
then y <c z for some c since z ∼ y, and wherever x may lie with respect to y <c z, it always
yields a SPE killer using <a or <b, so y <b z. The converse is similar, it follows actually from
the application of this partial result using <−1b and <
−1
a instead of <a and <b.
Now assume that <b|Oi 6=<a|Oi for some Oi, so x <a y and y <b x for some x, y ∈ Oi. Let
z, t ∈ Oi. By the claim just above z <a y iff y <b z, so by the same claim again z <a t iff t <b z,
which shows that <b|Oi=<a|
−1
Oi
. This proves the equivalence.
Finally, let us assume that the assertions hold. By definition of ∼, if Oi is not a singleton,
x <a y and y <b x for some a, b ∈ A and x, y ∈ Oi, so <b|Oi=<a|
−1
Oi
is witnessed. 
Theorem 16 extends Lemma 14 to many players and more complex preferences.
Theorem 16 Let g be a quasi-Borel game with players in A, outcomes in O, and linear pref-
erences <a for all a ∈ A. Let us assume that the inverses of the <a are well-ordered, and that
there exists a partition {Oi}i∈I of O and a linear order < of I such that:
• i < j implies x <a y for all a ∈ A and x ∈ Oi and y ∈ Oj .
• <b|Oi=<a|Oi or <b|Oi=<a|
−1
Oi
for all a, b ∈ A and i ∈ I.
Let us further assume that for all i ∈ I the plays with outcome in ∪j<iOj form a Dω1 set. Then
g has a global-Pareto subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof By Lemma 15 let us further assume wlog that <b|Oj=<a|
−1
Oj
is witnessed for all j ∈ I,
so the Oj are finite by well-ordering. Let us build a GP-SPE for g as the limit of a recursive
procedure: Let Oi be such that some outcome of Oi occurs in g and such that for all j > i no
outcome from Oj occurs in g. Let (γk)k∈K be the shortest nodes of g such that the outcomes
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occuring in gγk are in ∪j<iOj only. Let us define a quasi profile q for g by having the γk ignored
by their parents. G(g, q) consists of the gγk and of a game g
′. By Lemma 14 there is a GP-SPE
s′ for g′. (To see this, replace ∪j<iOj with one single fresh outcome y, i.e. y /∈ O and set y <a x
for all a ∈ A and x ∈ Oi.) Combining s
′ with GP-SPE for the gγk (obtained recursively) yields
a GP-SPE for g, since the choices made in g′ hold regardless of the choices made in the gγk . 
Corollary 17 Let A and O be non-empty finite sets (of players and of outcomes) and for all
a ∈ A let <a be a linear preference. The following are equivalent.
1. ∀a, b ∈ A,∀x, y, z ∈ O, ¬(z <a y <a x ∧ x <b z <b y).
2. Every Dω1-Gale-Stewart game using A, O and the <a has a GP-SPE.
Proof For 1. ⇒ 2. invoke Lemma 15 and Theorem 16, and prove 2. ⇒ 1. by contraposition
with the following folklore example which is detailed, e.g., in [16].
start a b a b x
y z y z

Corollary 17 and the results that lead to it considers linear preference only. Proposition 18
below show that this restriction incurs a loss of generality, which is partly solved in Section 4.
Proposition 18 Let us define two binary relations by z, t ≺a x, y and y ≺b z ≺b x ≺b t.
1. Dω1 infinite games with players a and b and preferences ≺a and ≺b have SPE.
2. The SPE killer occurs in any strict linear extensions of ≺a and ≺b.
Proof 1. follows Theorem 22. For 2. let ≺′a be a linear extension of ≺a. If x ≺
′
a y then
z ≺′a x ≺
′
a y and y ≺b z ≺b x. If y ≺
′
a x then t ≺
′
a y ≺
′
a x and y ≺b x ≺b t. 
4 Two players with strict weak order preferences
The preferences considered in Proposition 18 are strict weak orders. Informally, strict weak
orders are strict partial orders that can be seen as strict linear orders from afar, i.e. up to an
equivalence relation. Traditionally in game theory the outcomes are real-valued payoff functions
f, g : A → R and the preferences are defined by f ≺a g iff f(a) < g(a). These preferences are
not strict linear orders but they are strict weak orders, so the results from Section 3 are worth
generalizing. Strict weak orders are defined below.
Definition 19 (Strict weak order) A strict weak order is a strict partial order whose com-
plement is transitive, i.e. is satisfies ¬(x ≺ x) and x ≺ y∧ y ≺ z ⇒ x ≺ z and ¬(x ≺ y)∧¬(y ≺
z)⇒ ¬(x ≺ z).
Lemma 15 above describes the structure of strict linear orders void of the SPE killer. A similar
result for strict weak orders will be useful. Lemma 20 below is part to it, and the other part
appears directly in the proof of Lemma 21.
Lemma 20 Let ≺a and ≺b be two strict weak orders over some finite O.
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1. If ≺a and ≺b are void of the SPE killer, if there exists a ≺a-non-extremal element and a
≺b-non-extremal element, and if there is no partition {Ou, Ol} of O such that ¬(x ≺a y)
and ¬(x ≺b y) for all (x, y) ∈ Ou ×Ol, then ≺a ∩ ≺b= ∅.
2. If ≺a ∩ ≺b= ∅, there exists a linear extension < of ≺a such that ≺b⊆<
−1.
Proof
1. Let x be ≺b-minimal among the ≺a-maximal elements, and let y be ≺a-minimal among
the ≺b-maximal elements, so x 6= y by the partition assumption. Towards a contradiction
let us assume that, e.g., x is not ≺b-minimal, and let z be ≺b-minimal. For all t ≺b x,
it follows that t is not ≺a-maximal by definition of x, and ¬(y ≺a t) by absence of the
SPE killer. So y is not ≺a-minimal, otherwise z is also ≺a-minimal, thus contradicting the
partition assumption. So likewise, for all t ≺a y, it follows that t is not ≺b-maximal by
definition of y, and ¬(x ≺b t) by absence of the SPE killer. So the two-element partition
induced by {t ∈ O | t ≺a y ∨ t ≺b x} contradicts the partition assumption. This shows
that x is ≺b-minimal and y is ≺a-minimal. Towards a contradiction let us assume that
t(≺a ∩ ≺b)z for some t, z ∈ O. So {x, y} ∩ {z, t} = ∅. By the partition assumption z is
not both ≺a and ≺b-maximal, so, e.g., z ≺a x, and t is not both ≺a and ≺b-minimal. By
absence of the SPE killer t is ≺b-minimal, so y ≺a t by the partition assumption., and
subsequently z is ≺b-maximal. By assumption there exists γ that is neither ≺b-maximal
nor ≺b-minimal. Wherever γ lies wrt ≺a, the SPE killer occurs.
2. By induction on the cardinality of O, which holds for |O| = 0. Let x be ≺b-minimal
among the ≺a-maximal elements, so x is also ≺b-minimal since ≺a ∩ ≺b= ∅. By induction
hypothesis let <x witness the claim for ≺a|O\{x} and ≺b|O\{x}. The linear order < :=<x
∪{(y, x) | y ∈ O\{x}} witnesses the claim.

Lemma 21 below is a generalization of Corollary 13 from an order-theoretic point of view and a
special case thereof from a topological point of view. Due lack of space and strong similarities
with the proof of Lemma 12, the proof of Lemma 21 is in appendix.
Lemma 21 Let g be a game with two players a and b, finitely many outcomes O, and strict
weak order preferences void of the SPE killer. If each outcome corresponds to the union of an
open set and a closed set, the game has an SPE.
Furthermore, for every node γ of g let {Oγ1 , . . . , O
γ
nγ} be a partition of the outcomes of gγ
such that ¬(x ≺a y) and ¬(x ≺b y) for all 1 ≤ k < nγ and (x, y) ∈ O
γ
k+1 ×O
γ
k . There exists an
SPE for g such that the outcome induced at every node γ belongs to Oγnγ .
Proof By induction on the number of outcomes, which holds up to two outcomes. Let us
make a case disjunction for the inductive case. First main case, there is no partition {Ou, Ol}
of O such that ∀(x, y) ∈ Ou×Ol,¬(x ≺a y) ∧ ¬(x ≺b y). Let us make a nested case distinction.
First nested case, there exists a ≺a-non-extremal element and a ≺b-non-extremal element, so by
Lemma 20 let < be a linear extension of ≺a such that ≺b⊆<
−1. By [16] the antagonist game
with preference < has an SPE, which is also an SPE for ≺a and ≺b.
Second nested case, one preference, e.g., ≺a has only extremal elements. By the partition
assumption let y be ≺b-maximal and ≺a-minimal. Let Y be the set of plays with outcome y, and
let us define a quasi-profile q as follows. Let γ be the parent of a y-pseudo-leaf. If γ is owned by
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a, let a ignore the y-pseudo-leaves at γ; otherwise let b choose a y-pseudo-leaf at γ. Let us apply
this construction recursively (an ordinal number of times) to the games in G(g, q) that do not
involve y, until the Y ′ of each remaining game has empty interior. It is easy to check that Y ′ is
also closed since Y is the union of an open set and a closed set, by assumption. So let (γi)i∈I
be the shortest nodes that are not on any play with outcome y. The gγi do not involve y, so by
induction hypothesis they have suitable SPE si inducing some xi ∈ O, which allow us to start
the definition of a suitable SPE for g. Let us define g′ by modification of the outcome function
of g: let v′(γip) := xi for all i ∈ I and let v
′(p) := v(p) when γi 6⊑ p for all i ∈ I. Let Ma be the
≺a-maximal outcomes, and let us define a quasi-profile q
′ for g′ as follows. Let γ be the parent
of a Ma-pseudo-leaf, i.e. a shortest node involving outcome in Ma only. If γ is owned by a, let
a choose a Ma-pseudo-leaf at γ; otherwise let b ignore the Ma-pseudo-leave at γ. Let us apply
this recursively to the games in G(g′, q) that involve y. In the remaining games a can deviate
from a play with outcome y only to reach a (O\)Ma-pseudo-leaf, so every profile that follows
plays with outcome y whenever possible is a suitable SPE.
Second main case, there exist partitions {Ou, Ol} of O such that ∀(x, y) ∈ Ou × Ol,¬(x ≺a
y) ∧ ¬(x ≺b y). Among these partitions let us consider the one with the smallest possible
Ou. Let us make a further case disjunction. First case, |Ol| > 1. As is now customary, let us
start defining a suitable SPE for g by using the induction hypothesis on the maximal subgames
involving only outcomes in Ol, and on the game derived from g by replacing outcomes in Ol
with a fresh outcome y that is the new ≺a and ≺b-minimum.
Second case, |Ol| = {y}. By minimality of |Ou|, there is no partition {Ouu, Oul} of Ou such
that ∀(x, y) ∈ Ouu × Oul,¬(x ≺a y) ∧ ¬(x ≺b y). Therefore the situation is reminiscent of the
first main case above, but for ≺a|Ou and ≺b|Ou instead of ≺a and ≺b. In both nested cases
from the first main case, there exists some xn that is, e.g., ≺a|Ou-minimal and ≺b|Ou-maximal.
Applying the proof of Lemma 12 almost verbatim yields a suitable SPE for g

Theorem 22 Let g be a game with two players a and b, finitely many outcomes, a Dω1-
measurable outcome function, strict weak order preferences such that ¬(z ≺a y ≺a x ∧ x ≺b
z ≺b y) for all outcomes x, y and z. Then the game has an SPE.
Furthermore, for every node γ of g let {Oγ1 , . . . , O
γ
nγ} be a partition of the outcomes of gγ
such that ¬(x ≺a y) and ¬(x ≺b y) for all 1 ≤ k < nγ and (x, y) ∈ O
γ
k+1 ×O
γ
k . There exists an
SPE for g such that the outcome induced at every node γ belongs to Oγnγ .
Proof By induction on the levels in the difference hierarchy of the sets of plays corresponding
to the outcomes. The base case holds by Lemma 21.
For the inductive case, let y be an outcome whose corresponding set Y has level more than
one in the difference hierarchy, and let us make a case disjunction depending on the last step of
the construction of Y . The remainder of the proof can be taken almost verbatim from the proof
of Lemma 14, but by replacing ”GP-SPE” with ”suitable SPE”, and by invoking Lemma 21 or
the induction hypothesis instead of Corollary 13. 
Theorem 22 considers two-player games only. Observation 23 shows that absence of the SPE
killer is no longer a sufficient condition for a three-player game with strict weak order preferences
to have an SPE.
Observation 23 Let three players a,b and c have preferences z ≺a y ≺a x and t ≺b z ≺b y
and x ≺c t ≺c y. (and, e.g., y ∼a t, z ∼b x, and y ∼c z or x ∼c z)
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1. The SPE killer does not occur in the strict weak orders ≺a and ≺b and ≺c.
2. The following game with ≺a and ≺b and ≺c has no SPE.
start a b c a b c x
y z t y z t
Proof For 2. Towards a contradiction let us assume that there exists an SPE for the game.
Let us consider a node where player a chooses y. Then at the node right above it c chooses
to continue to benefit from y, and at the node above b chooses to continue, too. The induced
outcome at the node further above is y regardless of the choice of a, and so on up to the root.
Let us make a case disjunction: first case, there exists infinitely many nodes where a chooses
y, so b and c always continue by the remark above, so a has an incentive to continue too,
to induce outcome x, contradiction. Second case, there exists a node below which a always
continues. From then on, one player must stop at some point, otherwise the outcome is x and
c has an incentive to stop. The first player to stop cannot be b, otherwise a would stop before
b, and it cannot be c, otherwise b would stop before c, contradiction. 
Proposition 24 below shows that considering only strict weak orders incurs a loss of generality.
Proposition 24 Let us define two binary relations by γ ≺a y ≺a x and z ≺a β ≺a α and
x ≺b z ≺ y and α ≺b γ ≺b β.
1. The SPE killer occurs in every strict weak order extensions of ≺a and ≺b.
2. Dω1-games with players a and b and preferences ≺a and ≺b have SPE.
Proof
1. Let ≺′a be a strict weak order extension of ≺a. If z ≺
′
a y, the SPE killer occurs, with x. If
¬(z ≺′a y), then γ ≺
′
a β and the SPE killer occurs, with α.
2. It suffices to prove the claim for games where each outcome set is the union of an open
set and a closed set. (Then using a transfinite induction as in the proof of Lemma 14 will
do.) The techniques from Lemmas 12 and 21 are suitable here, and used without details.
If the outcome x does not occur in the game, note that ≺a|O\{x} and ≺b|O\{x} can be
extended into the strict weak orders z ≺′a γ ∼
′
a β ≺
′
a y ∼
′
a α and z ∼
′
b α ≺
′
b γ ≺
′
b y ∼
′
b β,
respectively, and that the SPE killer is absent from these. So by Theorem 22 the game has
an SPE wrt ≺′a and ≺
′
b and therefore also wrt ≺a and ≺b. (And likewise if the outcome α
does not occur in the game.)
Now one can reduce the set for x to a closed set by letting a choose the clopen balls with
constant outcome x and by letting b ignore them. The plays with outcomes different from
x can be seen as belonging to a union of subgames without x, so by the remark above they
have SPE. It allows us to replace these subgames with (pseudo)-leaves with outcomes the
ones induced by the SPE. Now one can let a choose the pseudo-leaves with outcome α and
b ignore them, which yields a game without outcome α. So by the remark above there is
an SPE for the game.

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